President Eisenhower and the NATO Essay Example for Free

President Eisenhower and the NATO EssayStephen Ambrose, in his book Eisenhower The President (pp. 215 216) gives a picture of the president as the driving force behind the NATO solution embodied in the Paris accords of late 1954. Is he safe or wrong? The abrupt end of the World strugglefare II following the bombing of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki apply atomic bombs heralded a period of heightened tension amidst the Western World represented by the US and the Eastern World represented by Soviet Union. Each of the two sides formed a myriad of alliances in bid to assert themselves across the stage of the world. NATO was one such alliance that was measuredly formed by the Capitalists (US and allies) to contain Communists (Soviet and allies). Though initially the alliance was more of a political formation than a force one, subsequent happenings in Europe, particularly the Korean War electrified the member states into forming a sound military alliance, with an integrated milita ry structure built under the direction of two US military commanders, one of them Eisenhower.The militarization of the alliance was necessary especially having in mind that the opposing blocs (communists) were in the form of building their own strong military arsenals and therefore there was need for a balance of bureau between the two blocs. Again, this was a period marked by costly defense spending, immense unoriginal and thermonuclear arms race, and a number of proxy struggles. Rosenberg, 1979 In his book, Ambrose seeks to differ with Eisenhowers friends as good as critics who regarded him as largely unprepared for the presidency.He depicts Eisenhower as one person who carried the best credentials among persons to ever been elected to the Presidency, particularly in matters concerning foreign affairs. Ambrose has got all the reasons to throw his weight behind Eisenhowers foreign relations capabilities, given the success that he (Eisenhower) achieved when he served at vario us military ranks in international duty during the World Wars and the Cold War, the most nonable one being his appointment as the first commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).Ambrose, 1984 Until his election as the 34th US President, Eisenhower was serving as the supreme commander of the NATO forces in Europe. Moreover, in his inaugural speech he vowed to drop his experience to end the Korean War. Being an experienced soldier and therefore understanding the raw invasion of the modern instruments than any other person, he resolved to appeal for peace. To achieve this he advocated for high direct of cooperation among the nations even among those who disagreed.He rejected the notion of an isolated America from the rest of the world, save behind its nuclear shield. He harbored the argument that active participation of the US in the world affairs was the most prehend method of making sure that democracy was achieved in nations that were susceptible to the encro achment of Communism. He in like manner harbored the tactile sensation that sustained dialogue between the US and the Soviet would be the best option for the provision of shelter to the entire world.To achieve this, he advocated for military and economic unification of the nations that formed the Western alliance, since according to him that was the nevertheless avenue for providing the much needed peace and freedom in the Western Europe. For example, he pursued the reinforcer of NATOs s prohibitedhern flank by helping Italian-Yugoslavian struggle over Trieste and proposed at the Geneva mend meeting a shared aerial inspection, a move that was aimed at pr shelling a surprise nuclear attack.He also proposed for a project known as atoms for peace program, that sought to provide loans to American uranium to bewilder not nations for peaceful purposes. Boll, 1988 In what seems to a support for the argument that Eisenhower understood the painful repercussions of warfare, Campbell C raig claims that Eisenhower workd the constitution of nuclear weapons intimidation to scare his advisors to shy from pushing him to declare war against the communists, and also to deter the communists themselves into going into war with the West, represented by the US.In his book Destroying the Village Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War Campbell Craig argues that Eisenhowers policy of defending the United States international interests was through general thermonuclear war. Craig, 1998 p. xi He reasons that between 1956 and 1957 Eisenhower rearranged the official American basic security policy in a way that, in the event of a war with the Soviet Union, the war would automatically escalate into general thermonuclear war. p. 67.The very scourge of a thermonuclear war would serve as a deterrence of such a war on a national level since the US policy makers will definitely resist escalation in a crisis. Craig puts it this way, Eisenhowers strategy to evade nuclear war was to make Ameri can military policy so dangerous that his advisors would find it impossible to push Eisenhower towards war and away from compromise. p. 69. This also served as deterrence to the Soviet Union as the prospect of going into a war that would escalate into thermonuclear war was so scarring.A fair analysis on Craigs work is that, it is short of neither accompaniment the use of rigid defense of nuclear weapons nor rejecting their strategic use. Consequently, Craig does not seem to support or rebut the claim that Eisenhower was directly behind the NATO solution to the encroachment of the Soviet Union and its allies. He lets his audience to make a conclusion however, his arguments seem to lean more on the notion that Eisenhower used nuclear weapon diplomacy and the strengthening of the NATO and unification of the states that formed the treaty.He argues that American avoidance of nuclear war did not just happen. Actual people, above all Eisenhower, sought to evade nuclear war many regna nt figures at the center of decision believed that such a war was justifiable and regularly called for steps that would have begun one. P. xii Soman argues that, during the period of crisis, between the years 954-1955, the Eisenhowers administration was mainly concerned on the tidy sum of the treaty for the Western European Union and the admission of Germany to NATO, which was to be ratified by the European nations.Particularly, the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles was filled with the fear that any event trail to a war with China that would involve nuclear weapons would move the European opinion away from the United States and therefore leading doubts on the ratification of the treaty. Soman argues that Eisenhowers success just like many other US Presidents of post-World War II era in maintaining the United States national security and the strengthening of the NATO in the face of military threats from the Soviets was through the use of nuclear weapon diplomacy.For instance, he explains how American atomic capabilities contributed to the working out of a truce in the North Korean war. He reasons that, Eisenhower had no option in the use of nuclear diplomacy to counter the encroachment of the Soviet Union and its allies he had inherited a stalemated war in the Korea, a costly military build up, and armed forces that despite around three years of massive conventional rearmament still left the United States heavily dependent on atomic arsenal. Soman, 2000 p. 36 He therefore chose to reject any Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons knowing very well that this was his only trump card.